Vom Substanzbegriff zum Funktionsbegriff – zum Begriff. Cassirer zwischen Kant und Hegel

The neo-Kantian concept of the concept determinacy is conceived of as mediation but not also as self-mediation. In terms of Hegel, neo-Kantianism conceives of the concept as an essence, not as a concept. Consequently, neo-Kantianism does insufficient justice to its own claim of transcendental idealism to be the self-knowledge of reason. To substantiate this thesis, first, the functional account of the concept as developed by the Marburg neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer and the Southwest neo-Kantian Bruno Bauch is scrutinized. Subsequently, the transcendental idealist conception of the concept as a function-concept is problematized by taking Hegel's speculative-idealist doctrine of concepts into account. It becomes clear that concept progresses from itself as a concept of substance to the function-concept, and finally to the concept and the Southwest neo-Kantian Bruno Bauch is scrutinized.

Subsequently, the transcendental idealist conception of the concept as a function-concept is problematized by taking Hegel's speculative-idealist doctrine of concepts into account. It becomes clear that concept progresses from itself as a concept of substance to the function-concept, and finally to the concept. [Publisher's text]